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1. Labour market policy: goals and constraints 
Labour market institutions have an important role in a world where financial markets and public 
redistribution schemes are imperfect, inaccessible, or ineffective. Minimum wages, collective 
bargaining, unemployment insurance, and employment protection legislation can target income 
redistribution across individuals and over time. In doing so, they cannot generally avoid loss of 
productive efficiency: unemployment insurance and employment protection tend to shift labour 
into unemployment, and to remove individual mobility incentives to allocate labour where it 
would be most productive.  
Like the serious health problems and other life‐shaping events targeted by government policies, 
job loss can result from the individual’s own behaviour, which cannot be readily observed, as 
well as from objective circumstances which are hard to verify. Hence, private contracts cannot 
generally protect workers from labour income risk. An insurance contract specifying the 
circumstances where a worker would be entitled to compensation when fired would be 
exceedingly complex to write, and essentially impossible to enforce privately. Workers covered 
by incomplete private insurance contracts would not work as hard, and would be fired so much 
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more promptly than uninsured workers as to make insurance either unprofitable for the issuer, 
or too costly for purchasers. 
Governments have obvious enforcement advantages and may exploit better information about 
individual circumstances and interactions across agents, and for this reason policy interventions 
in labour markets are widespread and, to some extent, beneficial. Collective instruments, 
however,  need not unambiguously improve welfare. Political decision processes may be shaped 
by inefficient rent‐seeking incentives, and the information problems that prevent financial 
markets from providing insurance also imply efficiency losses from imperfect government 
policies. Workers covered by unemployment insurance (UI) schemes do not have strong 
incentives to avoid job loss and to find new jobs, and employment protection legislation (EPL) 
that makes it difficult for employers to fire redundant workers slows down labour reallocation 
towards more productive jobs, thus reducing production and profitability, at the same time as it 
stabilizes workers' labour income. 
For these reasons, lower employment and higher unemployment are unavoidable side effects of 
policies meant to redistribute income towards workers who cannot easily access those financial 
markets that, in a perfect world, would make it possible for them to partake of aggregate 
production, and to stabilize random labour income fluctuations. Different countries choose the 
stringency and character of policies differently. In some countries, financial markets are 
relatively well developed, and UI and EPL are implemented at low intensity.  Countries equipped 
with suitable administration schemes prefer to control labour income risk with UI; other 
countries implement EPL, effectively shifting the burden of labour income smoothing on 
employers. 
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Figure 1 illustrates the impact of labour market policies in a stylized way. If workers faced by a 
downward‐sloping labour demand function only care about the aggregate wage bill, they are 
collectively better off when the wage is set at a level higher than that which equates supply and 
demand. The higher wage at the end of the upward‐pointing arrow implies lower employment 
along the labour demand schedule, as indicated by the horizontal arrow in the picture, as well as 
smaller production:  but the incidence of smaller production is not on workers if they earn no 
other income than wages.  
Unlike “representative” individuals, who also consider the producer’s surplus between the wage 
and labour’s marginal productivity, workers are better off when taxes and regulations increase 
the marginal productivity of labour, and the resulting wage bill. This may be  achieved by legal or 
contractual wage minima which imply unemployment (involuntary from the perspective of 
individual workers, who are prevented from bidding down the wage of employment 
relationships), as well as by payroll taxes which finance transfers to non‐employed individuals, in 
the form of pension or unemployment or family benefits.   All such policies serve similar 
purposes: while an explicit wage floor prohibits workers from bidding down other workers’ 
wages, alternative income‐support sources eliminate the need to bid for employment. Other 
policies, such as employment protection legislation and unemployment insurance schemes, also 
aim at redistributing income flows, not only away from other factors and towards labour, but 
also across workers who enjoy better or worse luck in the labour market, and cannot access 
private financial and insurance markets so as to offset the implications of labour income 
fluctuations for their family’s welfare. And these policies also trade off such welfare gains off 
losses of productive efficiency and employment, as they unavoidably slow down reallocation of 
labour from relatively less to relatively more productive jobs. 
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2. National policies and international economic integration 
International economic integration tends to worsen the employment and unemployment side 
effects  of national policies meant to raise and stabilize labour incomes. Employment is more 
sensitive to production costs when factors can be substituted and production moved across 
countries’ borders, and prices have stronger effects on product sales in more competitive 
markets. Economic integration improves employment and production opportunities, making it 
possible to exploit comparative advantage or scale economies, so as to improve production 
efficiency. Just because it makes it easier for markets to compare and choose among alternative 
modes and locations of production, however, economic integration also increases the elasticity 
of employment to labour costs (see Andersen and Skaksen, 2007, for an explicit model and a 
fuller formal discussion). 
International economic integration allows market participants not only to pursue efficiency 
more freely, but also to circumvent collective regulation. Thus, economic integration makes it 
difficult or impossible to enforce policies meant to shape individual choices differently from 
what would be implied by imperfect market mechanisms(Sinn, 2003). To the extent that labour 
market rigidities prevent countries from reaping the fruits of economic integration, their effects 
on employment and productivity should be all the more negative as technical progress and 
policy reforms dismantle barriers to international trade and factor mobility, and it may be 
expected that governments should find it desirable to deregulate their countries’ labour 
markets (Bertola, 2006). 
This has clear implications for the effects of labour market policies meant to alter labour market 
outcomes for income distribution purposes.  As shown in Figure 2, a flatter labour demand 
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relationship implies that a given wedge inserted between labour demand and supply implies 
sharper employment losses.  The smaller wage gains implied by a flatter labour demand worsen 
the trade‐off faced by labour market policy, as it reduces its positive impact on labour income 
and strengthens its unemployment and inefficiency side effects. If policies are reformed in light 
of this, then employment may well increase.  Reforms are difficult to implement, however, also 
because many forward‐looking decisions are based on their framework, and any deregulation 
denies some workers protection they thought they could count on.  Through this mechanism, 
economic integration may be associated with worse employment outcomes if policies are not 
suitably reformed. 
As integration tends to foster efficiency of employment, it increases the level as well as the cost 
sensitivity of labour demand. Hence, wages and employment can both increase even as policy 
becomes less intrusive (Andersen and Skaksen, 2007). But a higher elasticity of labour demand 
also implies more volatility of employment and wages in response to product market shocks 
(Scheve and Slaughter, 2004). This increases the appeal of policies meant to buffer the welfare 
implications of uninsurable risk (Agell, 2002). Thus, economic integration increases the 
desirability of labour market regulation (as long as markets remain imperfect) at the same time 
as it decreases its efficacy. In practice, the balance of these forces may associate economic 
integration with more or less pervasive institutional interference with labour market 
mechanisms. 
3. An empirical question, and answers from EMU 
The European countries that joined EMU are characterized by particularly pervasive and possibly 
inefficient regulation of labour markets, and EMU’s peculiarly strong form of economic 
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integration also fosters political incentives to improve labour market flexibility: since member 
countries renounce all independence in monetary and trade policy, and much independence in 
other policies, political processes that might otherwise preserve the institutional status quo of 
labour markets can be forced into reform. As “there is no alternative” (TINA), EMU countries 
should find it desirable to deregulate their labour markets.  Monetary union can however foster 
a “there is no need” rather than a TINA attitude in political‐economic interactions: in the 
absence of crisis danger, and of national monetary policy tools, unions and employers may not 
set wages so as to ensure a satisfactory employment outcome (Calmfors, 2001). 
While aggregate wage and employment flexibility is certainly important in the absence of 
exchange rate changes, relative wage and employment flexibility is perhaps even more 
important across the regions, sectors, and occupations of countries where market integration 
reduces the relevance of country‐level shocks and increases that of specific shocks.  As other 
adjustment channels are shut down in a single‐currency area, flexibility of labour markets may 
be a priority from the EMU‐wide point of view. But labour market policy making remains 
essentially national, so actual reform patterns are influenced by coordination problems. 
This interrelated set of possible channels of interaction between labour market policies, labour 
market outcomes, and international economic integration defines an interesting and essentially 
empirical question. Deeper economic integration in the Euro area may be associated with better 
or worse employment performances, depending on whether sharper negative employment 
effects of existing policies, or the resulting tendencies to deregulate labour markets, are the 
dominant feature of actual country experiences. To flesh out the relevant mechanisms, it 
interesting not only to see whether employment and unemployment performances are different 
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in and out of EMU, but also to see whether the EMU economic integration experience yields 
evidence of labour market deregulation and of sharper effects of remaining regulation.  
In order to characterize these phenomena, it is possible to try and detect differences between 
countries and periods that are in and out of EMU. Early data did not offer strong evidence in this 
respect (Duval and Elmeskov, 2006). But research by Bertola (2008b) and Alesina, Ardagna, and 
Galasso (2008) explores more recent data to see whether Economic Monetary Union was 
associated with significant deregulation in product and labour markets. The data and 
methodologies of these papers are similar, and not surprisingly yield consistent results. EMU 
countries experienced substantial deregulation of their product markets and some deregulation 
of their labour markets, especially in the ‘secondary’ segments where workers find temporary 
employment. Deregulation was not uniform across countries and policy instruments, and it is 
possible to detect in the data relationships between the speed and character of deregulation, 
and other relevant variables’ paths. Within EMU, for example, product market reforms were 
more significant in countries that were experiencing loss of competitiveness. Labour tax 
reductions, while sharper in EMU and statistically related to the trade expansion associated with 
adoption of the single currency, were also empirically related to country‐specific budgetary 
conditions. And while the generosity of unemployment insurance schemes actually increased in 
EMU, it was mirrored by a relatively fast decline of the stringency of employment protection 
provisions.  
The tables in this chapter document a subset of such findings, focusing on the association of 
EMU with differences in labour market outcomes and labour taxes, as detected by regressions 
on a “dummy” variable that equals zero in non‐EU countries and in EU countries that have not 
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yet adopted the common currency in the year considered, but equals unity in 1999 and later 
years for Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, 
and in 2001 and later years for Greece. Of course, changes could be more gradual than adoption 
of the euro, reflecting anticipation effects and adjustment lags. Bertola (2008b) shows that the 
results are essentially identical to those detected  by the EMU dummy coefficient if regressions 
are specified so as to allow trends in the 1995‐2005 to differ across the countries that eventually 
do and do not adopt the common currency.  
To control for permanent country characteristics, the regressions include fixed effects, so that 
country‐specific constants absorb the implications of climate, culture, and other country‐specific 
features that are certainly relevant for employment, unemployment, and policies, but are 
difficult to measure precisely and unlikely to change over a limited span of years. The 
regressions also include year effects, to avoid attributing to EMU the effects of concurrent 
developments, such as the global business cycle and EU enlargement, that presumably affect 
EMU and other comparable countries in similar ways. Accordingly, the regression coefficient of 
an EMU dummy picks up the average difference (between countries that do and do not adopt 
the single currency) of year‐specific means of the left‐hand side variable. That coefficient is 
influenced by contemporaneous developments only to the extent that they affect Eurozone 
countries differently from others, and by the unobserved country features absorbed by fixed 
effects only to the effect that those features interact with EMU membership in equally 
unobserved (but relevant) ways.  
In Table 1, there is evidence that EMU is associated with lower unemployment and higher 
employment. Bertola (2008b) also finds that the evidence is stronger in the youth and female 
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segments of the labour force. These demographic groups’ labour supply and employment 
outcomes are more sensitive to policy wedges (Bertola, Blau, and Kahn, 2007), but may also 
reflect cultural trend differences that have little to do with economic integration. For this 
reason, a more reliable gauge of policy‐related developments may be the prime‐age male 
employment rate, which Bertola (2008b) finds to be significantly higher in EMU country‐period 
observations than in a broad comparison group including non‐EMU members of the EU and 
other comparable OECD countries.  
Thus, at least part of the raw change in labour market outcomes for the sample of countries that 
did join EMU appears to be associated with EMU itself, rather than with the identity of the 
countries or with the influences of common (to the industrialized countries in the sample) 
factors captured by year effects. There is weak or no evidence in Table 1 of changes in per capita 
or per‐hour production, suggesting that a movement along the labour demand curve was 
accompanied by an upward shift of labour productivity relative to the control group. 
There is similar evidence of an association between EMU and changes in labour market policies. 
The decline in labour taxation is statistically insignificant in the fifth column of Table 1, but it is 
easy to find stronger evidence of regulation with regressions specifications meant to investigate 
a little deeper the determinants of policy choices. In the next column, controlling for 
government deficits (Maastricht definition) increases the size and significance of the average 
labour tax reduction in EMU vis‐à‐vis the non‐EMU portion of the sample: since year and 
country dummies are included, the significantly negative impact of EMU on labour taxation 
becomes evident when the relative need to improve government finances is accounted for. 
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It is also possible to see whether in the data, as in the theory illustrated by Figure 2, labour 
market policy has sharper negative implications for employment under conditions of tighter 
economic integration. Consider, for example, the association between employment rate and tax 
wedge data. In Figure 3, the overall association between the two is ambiguously sloped: some 
countries, such as Sweden, are able to sustain both high employment and high taxes, while 
others, such as Greece, lie low along both dimensions. This presumably reflects specific 
characteristics of each country’s economic and social structure, such as the more or less 
“encompassing” character of their policymaking and wage bargaining processes. But the figure 
also shows that many countries experienced large shifts in both of these variables over the 
sample period, and that typical country‐specific trajectories are negatively sloped (in the 
direction of lower taxes and higher employment).  
Do the data support theoretically sensible association of tighter integration with more negative 
employment effects of labour market policies? Figure 4 offers a simple ‘yes’ answer: if the data 
points are split into those that refer to an EMU country and period and those that do not 
(plotted by E and 0 symbols, respectively, in the figure), the slope of the relationship between 
employment and taxation is more negative in the former group. The difference, while 
statistically significant in the underlying regressions, is not dramatic in the figure, where the 
slopes of both regressions lines struggle to fit observations both across and within the countries 
in each group. It is possible to obtain more convincing evidence allowing each country to have 
its own intercept (the coefficient of country fixed effects, as in Table 1) and running regressions 
of employment rates on labour taxation and its interaction with economic integration.  
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Controlling for country fixed effects, the first column of Table 2 estimates a very significant and 
large coefficient for labour taxes as an explanatory variables of aggregate employment rates in 
the EU15 sample. Among the forces driving tax and employment outcomes along tradeoffs such 
as that illustrated in Figure 1, some – such as increasing openness to Far East trade and 
technological changes – are common across the entire sample. But others may be specific to 
EMU members and years. The second column of Table 2 includes the EMU dummy and its 
interaction with labour tax rates among the explanatory variables, thus allowing the relationship 
between taxes and employment to differ across the EMU and non‐EMU subsamples. Again 
controlling for country fixed effects, the regressions detect a negative and strongly significant 
interaction. Bertola (2008b) also finds that there is a negative and significant interaction 
between labour taxes and trade openness, which in turn is empirically related to adoption of a 
common currency.  
4. Summary and implications 
The evidence is consistent with the mechanisms outlined in Section 2: monetary union 
strengthens the negative association between marginal labour tax rates and employment. Tax 
reductions associated with EMU, while statistically significant, have a modest economic impact 
in this exercise, confirming that reforms have not been as dramatic as TINA views might have 
predicted. But the change in slope illustrated in Figure 2 above can be detected in the data, and 
does have negative implications for employment. There is similar, and sometimes stronger, 
evidence as regards other policies and outcomes. In the data, EMU membership is associated 
with somewhat smaller labour tax rates, and with more general labour market deregulation 
(European Commission, 2007, 2008; Bertola, 2008b). While reforms were nowhere near as 
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drastic as “TINA” views might have led one to expect, the resulting higher employment can be 
viewed as confirmation that, in an integrated economic area, national labour market policies 
face less favourable tradeoffs: unchanged national policies would have implied employment 
losses, and deregulation more than offset that tendency in the actual EMU experience. 
Consistently with this view, remaining tax differences – as might be implied by different 
budgetary and political conditions – appear to be more strongly and negatively associated with 
employment in EMU than out of it.   
When interpreting the evidence it is important to keep in mind that countries that adopted the 
euro certainly differ from the others in many relevant respects. They were not forced by an 
experimenter to join EMU. They chose to do so, and their decision was presumably influenced 
by their own characteristics as well as by the relationships between observable variables 
detected in the data. The observed pattern of institutional and outcome dynamics can be a 
natural consequence of the fact that many of the first wave of Eurozone countries had the most 
room for unemployment reduction and flexibility‐oriented reforms. The data can neither 
confirm nor deny that countries in the sample that did not but could join (Denmark, the UK, and 
Sweden) did not want or need to reform, or that countries that did join EMU may have done so 
also in order to obtain suitable reform incentives. But they can tell us that  the intensity and the 
(good and bad) effects of country‐level policy interference with labour market outcomes are 
correlated with EMU membership.  
Just like uncoordinated macroeconomic policies, fixed exchange rate, and free capital mobility 
were incoherent with each other before Economic and Monetary Union, so free mobility of 
goods and/or factors, local decision‐making powers in the labor‐market and social protection 
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area, and social inclusion coexist uneasily (Bertola, 2007): privileging two of the three aspects 
necessarily implies forsaking the third. Independent National policymaking authority in an 
integrated, barrier‐free markets reduces the incisiveness of policies. The evidence reviewed in 
this chapter indicates that EMU has indeed been associated with at least some deregulatory 
tendency in the labour market. 
Bertola (2008a,b) also documents an association of these phenomena with higher disposable 
income inequality, also driven by lower social spending. Financial market development can 
control the welfare effects of income inequality and instability, by allowing all individuals to 
partake both of wages and other forms of income and to smooth the implications of labour 
income instability by borrowing and lending. EMU has been associated with robust financial 
development, especially as regards firm financing (Jappelli and Pagano, 2008).  In 2008, 
however, financial turmoil has not spared EMU countries. The resulting loss of confidence in the 
ability of markets to package and control risk effectively brings labour market policies back to 
the fore of political debates. To the extent that the effects of labour market institutions are (or 
are perceived to be) desirable, membership in a monetary union requires different policy 
approaches, based on harmonized regulation and modernization of insurance‐oriented policies 
and of industrial relations. 
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 Unemploy‐
ment 
Employment GDP per 
capita 
Labour 
productivity 
Labour Tax Labour tax 
EMU ‐0.8328 1.7308 ‐0.0299 1.9127  ‐0.2589   ‐2.3557  
t ‐0.94 2.13 ‐0.05 0.63  ‐0.35   ‐5.44  
Govt. 
Budget 
      0.1344  
 t       1.30  
N 154 154 154 154  140  124 
 
TABLE 1: Regressions on EMU dummy (equal to unity in 1999‐2005 for Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal). Year 
dummies and country fixed effects are included (not shown), robust t statistics are 
shown below the coefficients. Sample: EU15, 1995‐2005.  
Data definition and sources: 
Unemployment, age 15 and  over, % of labour force. Source: Eurostat. 
Employment, age 15 and  over, % of population. Source: Eurostat. 
GDP per capita at 1995 prices, thousands of euro. Source: Eurostat. 
Labour productivity per hour worked, PPS gdp, EU15=100. Source: Eurostat. 
Labour tax: total wedge in %, single workers at 100% of average earnings, no child. 
Source: OECD. 
Govt.Budget: General government surplus (deficit if negative),  Maastricht criteria 
definition, % GDP. Source: Eurostat. 
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 Employment 
rate 
Employment 
rate    
  Labour Tax     ‐0.6777      ‐0.3470  
     t        ‐9.36        ‐4.63  
          EMU                  6.8981  
         t                     4.27  
Labour  
Tax*EMU
                ‐0.1035  
      t                    ‐2.89  
            N    140     140  
 
TABLE 2: Regressions of total employment rate on labour tax and its interactions with 
an EMU dummy (equal to unity in 1999‐2005 for Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, 
Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, in 2002‐05 for Greece). Country 
effects are included (not shown), robust t statistics are shown below the coefficients. 
Definition and sources: see note to Table 1. 
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Figure 1: The effect of minimum wages or labour taxes that finance subsidies to workers. 
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Figure 2: The implications of stronger cost sensitivity of labour demand for the  
employment effects of labour market policies.
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Figure 3: Employment and labour tax rates in the EU15, 1995‐2005. Definition and 
source: see note to Table 1. 
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Figure 4: Same data as in Figure 3, and regression lines with different slopes and 
intercepts  for EMU (marked by “E”) and non‐EMU (marked as “o”) observations. The 
steeper line is the one estimated on the EMU sample, where differences in taxation 
(across countries and over time) are on average associated with larger differences in 
employment rates.  
